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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS



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Editorial Note: PRODUCTION NOW is the immediate job but post-war considerations naturally attract attention in nearly all phases of agricultural life. This issue of the REVIEW reflects both facts—and marks Thomas Jefferson's bicentennial year.

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Agriculture Builds for the Future

By RAYMOND C. SMITH. *Here we learn of the chief essentials of agricultural planning, of the problems involved in the planning process, what, how, and by whom agricultural planning is being done, and why citizens should take active part.*



THERE IS a growing interest in post-war planning. Farm people are realizing that the Nation will face tremendous problems at the end of the war. They are showing an increasing concern about being prepared in advance to meet these problems.

In broad terms, post-war planning in agriculture is directed toward bringing about an enduring world peace and with it the opportunity for freer exchange of products between Nations and consequent rising standards of living in all Nations. It is directed toward attaining a healthy and expanding national peacetime economy, and toward developing a better agriculture and a higher standard of living for farm people.

Post-war planning in agriculture cannot be limited to planning for agriculture. The agriculture economy does not exist unto itself. It is an integral part of our total na-

tional economy, which in turn is an integral part of the world economy. Farmers have a real stake in world trade. They cannot neglect planning to bring about the kind of an enduring peace which will be conducive to freer and expanding world trade.

Neither can farmers afford to neglect to plan for a healthy national economy. They should throw their whole weight into the balance on the side of helping to plan for a growing and expanding national economy. The only way farmers can be prosperous over any considerable period is for their customers to be prosperous and have the purchasing power to buy the kinds and quantities of food needed for nutritious diets and to buy needed fiber and forest products.

Farmers therefore also have a real stake in full employment in industry at home. In fact, since urban people make up most of the farm-

ers' market, and since, through differentials in birth and death rates between farm and nonfarm areas, many farm youth need chances for jobs in cities, farmers have even a greater stake in full urban employment at good wages than do most other groups.

It is possible that agriculture might center its efforts after the war on trying to get a larger slice of a small pie rather than make vigorous efforts, along with others, to assure a large pie. But an equitable share of a large pie would almost certainly be better for agriculture than an inequitably large share of a small pie, for without efforts to bring about an expanding economy a small pie is likely to shrink to an even smaller size. All of this is not to say that agriculture should not plan for agriculture itself. It is simply to say that an important part of the agricultural problem lies outside of agriculture, and that this portion must receive attention along with the rest of the problem.

Post-war planning in agriculture is really a twofold job. On the one hand, agriculture, a part of a national and of a world economy, has to plan, along with other groups, to bring about the kind of a national economy and the kind of international relations that it needs. On the other hand, it has to plan for making adjustments in agriculture to meet whatever national and international situations may actually evolve.

Unprecedented

Our unprecedented wartime production record, in both industry and agriculture, which has provided good jobs at good wages for sub-

stantially all of our people who were able and willing to work, has demonstrated what the Nation can accomplish when it has the will for great achievement. It has convinced most people that we need not have a disastrous depression at the end of the war if the Nation—the people that make up the Nation—wills otherwise. Yet it is possible that we could have the worst depression in our history at some time following the end of the war unless vigorous positive steps were taken to prevent it.

Potentialities Great

But if measures are carefully planned and put into action, and if meanwhile we develop positive plans to move forward when peace comes toward realizing fully on the great potentialities which our country provides, it will be possible for us to have a better agriculture and rural life than we have ever known.

Agriculture should be prepared to contribute its full share toward preventing difficulties during the demobilization and reconversion period and toward realizing on the great possibilities that lie ahead after the war. Yet at the same time it should be prepared with plans that will enable it to weather possible storms ahead if they are not entirely prevented. In other words agriculture should be prepared for any eventuality, after the war.

The People's Decisions

In our democracy the matter lies in the hands of the people. Their efforts and their decisions will determine whether or not the necessary steps are taken to avoid disas-

ter in the years immediately following the close of the war. They will determine whether or not we take advantage of the opportunity to move forward to a better life for all of us in the longer-time future. The Department of Agriculture feels a responsibility to study post-war problems and possible solutions, and to place all obtainable information that has a bearing upon these problems in the hands of farm people and other citizens to aid them as they make these vital decisions.

Under Way

The Department's post-war planning activities are being carried on jointly by various agencies and bureaus, through interbureau committees and working groups, both in Washington and in the field. The Department and the Land-Grant Colleges are cooperating closely in the work.

Among the problems on which work is now under way are the following:

(1) Production adjustments in agriculture needed (a) during the demobilization period and (b) to bring about desirable production in the period following conversion from a war to a peacetime economy. The second part of this activity is pointed toward the year 1950, whenever a date is essential to the analysis. Within an assumed over-all framework of full employment and high national income, adequate nutrition for the people, international collaboration, and a high level of agricultural prices and income, an attempt will be made to indicate the pattern of crop and livestock production and the methods and techniques of production that should be

followed, the amount of land that should be brought into or retired from production, the number and kind of farms that would be needed, and the labor force that would be required. Comparison of this pattern with the present situation will indicate the adjustments that would be necessary by production-adjustment areas and for the nation as a whole.

(2) Marketing and distribution during the demobilization period with some attention to longer-time problems. This involves work on the integration of food requirements of the United States with estimates of world supply and allocations; re-adjustments in processing and marketing facilities and methods; disposition of wartime regulations concerning food distribution; the place, if any, of price and rationing controls during the transition period; methods of insuring better nutrition among under-privileged groups; marketing and price measures designed to guide production and distribution; programs to maintain farm prices and income; and programs of cooperation with other exporting nations.

(3) Disposition of surplus land, supplies, and equipment used by military forces and war plants, including the use of chemical plants for manufacture of fertilizer after the war.

(4) Opportunities for returned veterans and others on farms after the war.

(5) Conservation and development of physical resources, including crop and pasture lands, range lands, and forest lands. Conservation has been a long-standing problem but the extra strain of war production on our physical resources

has increased the necessity for conservation measures. Development of new resources may be needed to meet post-war production demands. Plans are being developed to provide for acceleration in the application of conservation measures and for needed development work.

(6) Other long-standing problems on which post-war action is being planned lie chiefly in the domain of family living. Among these are rural health and sanitation, rural housing and equipment, rural electrification, social security for farm people, tenure, and credit.

(7) Agricultural-industrial relations and the place of industries in rural areas.

(8) Development of a shelf of works projects to be carried out in case the situation after the war calls for public action of this character. Works projects will be planned to accomplish many of the indicated improvements in the fields of physical resources and farm-family living, wherever the situation after the war indicates the development of works projects to be the most appropriate method of providing worth-while improvements.

Already

Work is being done on all these subjects both in Washington and in the field. It is hoped that reports on most of this work eventually will be available to farm people and others who are interested. In addition to a large volume of working materials, three national reports have been published as a result of preliminary work: (1) *Agriculture When the War Ends*—a mimeographed document of 57 pages, (2) *What Post-War Policies for Agri-*

Discussion

Men are never so likely to settle a question rightly as when they discuss it freely.

—MACAULAY

culture?—a printed leaflet of 13 pages in the *Farmer and the War* series, and (3) *Maintaining Demand for Farm Products: Demand for Farm Products Depends Upon the City*—a multilithed leaflet of 10 pages. Several other reports will probably be available soon.

A dozen or more staff members of the Department of Agriculture and of other Government Departments along with representatives of farmers, took part in the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, at Hot Springs, Va. This was the first great effort at planning for food and agriculture in the international field. A publication by the Department called "American Farmers and the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture" tells the story of the conference, in brief, and last winter's number of the *Land Policy Review* was devoted to the highlights of the Conference.

During this past winter the Department and the land-grant colleges, working together, attempted to bring these problems and others into focus, State by State. Preliminary working reports were prepared in all States. In a few cases these reports were published by the col-

leges, but in most instances they are being used as a basis for additional planning work.

As Citizens

The Department believes that technicians of the Department and the colleges are being of real service to farmers when they collect the facts about post-war problems and analyze them for the public. But there is a limit to what public agencies can do. They can present facts and show the probable consequences of various alternative lines of action in meeting the problems. But it is the citizens themselves, farm families and others, who will have to study the facts carefully, and weigh them in terms of the interests and wishes of farm people, and then in terms of national welfare and future international cooperation. They will have to weigh short-run advantages against long-run benefits.

Prompt Action

This brings into view the opportunities and responsibilities of farmers as citizens in a democracy. The same is true of their farm organizations. Unless farmers as citizens, and as members of organized groups, study post-war problems now and evolve what they believe to be practicable and acceptable solutions, this Nation is not likely to be ready to solve post-war agricultural

Weapon

Education is the chief defense of nations.

—EDMUND BURKE

problems promptly, when the crucial need for their solution arises.

Because of the complexity of these problems, and the fact that they extend beyond agriculture itself, farmers will find it necessary to consider many of them along with representatives of labor and of industry and they will have always to remember international phases and consequences.

Pledged

This is not an easy task. But it is clear that much can be accomplished. Much will have to be accomplished if agriculture is not to find itself in a very serious situation after the war. The Department of Agriculture stands pledged and ready to do all within its power to assist farmers, and other groups who are interested in agriculture, as they develop plans for meeting post-war problems. It is also ready to work with representatives of other segments of our economy in those fields that affect the welfare of all.

Throughout history, every big nation has been given an opportunity to help itself by helping the world.

—HENRY A. WALLACE

VETERANS & WAR WORKERS— BACK-TO-THE-LAND?

By V. WEBSTER JOHNSON. *There will probably be post-war settlement whether anyone wants it or not. Here are questions to consider, the essentials of a sound program, and some things to do now.*



AFTER all wars certain veterans, industrial workers, and others dislocated by the war, move to the land. In depressions, likewise, the land has often been a place of refuge for industrial and other urban workers and for elderly and disabled people who hoped for security, stability, and a good life. These experiences in the past have frequently brought hardship, suffering, and privation although of course many have found security.

Since the war began about a million and a half young men have left farms to serve in the armed forces. Probably double this number of farm people have taken jobs in war industries and other work. Before the war ends, thousands more will leave farms for industry and the armed forces.

But when the war is over many of these young men of farm background will want to return to farms. Others, without farm experience, may seek opportunity on the land as a means of livelihood and as a way of life.

Will the opportunities be large enough to absorb all of those who may want to farm? The answer is, No. Of the $4\frac{1}{2}$ million persons who left farms during the last $2\frac{1}{2}$

years, probably not more than a third could find full-time work on farms after the war as laborers, tenants, or owners, even if food production continued at current wartime peaks.

But there will be opportunities for some. Although the extent of the opportunities in farming after the war will depend upon such things as demand for farm products here and abroad, and upon jobs in the city, the range of opportunities is not small. They look about like this: Farmers grow old and retire. Some of the best opportunities to obtain good developed farms will come from this source. If retirement continues at the rate experienced in the last two decades there may be about 350,000 family-size farms of all types available to new operators in the first five years after the war. Many soldiers and non-soldiers want a part-time farm. That is, they want to hold down a part-time job in the city and yet farm a few acres. There will be opportunities for people who want "one foot on the land" provided the other foot is firmly planted in an urban job.

This is not all. Approximately 250,000 new farms could be developed, if needed, through irriga-

tion, drainage, or clearing work and through return of some military lands to their pre-war use in agriculture. The rate at which these lands could be developed depends upon the speed with which several large public-works projects are completed.

The need for farm products and consequently the demand for farms will differ under full employment from that in under-employment. So far as humanly possible, full employment must be maintained. Security for the future rather than fear and unrest should be a primary aim of social policy. If this is to be accomplished, agricultural leaders and farm people, along with other groups in our economy, must meet squarely the important issues and questions, the answers to which will determine the extent that the goals of jobs, security, and decent living are realized.

Questions

In addition to those who have succeeded, many people have failed in their attempts to settle on the land in the past and if things are building up to another movement back to the land—what should we do about it? A good first step is to do a little thinking about two of the important questions that we must face. For instance,

(1) Agricultural production on existing farms could be increased substantially within the next few years through improved farm practices with no expansion in our present agricultural plant. Will the markets be available to absorb this increase in production along with the increase resulting from new land development? *If not, shall we still*

encourage both, or one or the other, or neither?

(2) The United States is essentially an industrial Nation, and will probably want to export industrial products to some predominantly agricultural Nations. *Are we prepared to take in return the products that such Nations will want to sell us?*

Decision Imperative

So, as a Nation we need to decide what we want to do. Do we want to increase production by using present farm lands more intensively, or do we want to open new lands, or will it be necessary to do both? We also must decide whether or not we will accept agricultural products in payment for industrial products. The decisions that are made on these and other questions will determine the direction of our settlement program.

Essentials of Program

Does this mean that until these questions are decided nothing can or should be done about settlement? We believe it does not. Certain things that we know now should be applied to the guidance of settlement that is sure to come in the months ahead.

Whatever is done to help people settle on farms should contribute to

United

On the duty of saving our land there can be no division among patriotic men and women.

—MAURY MAVERICK

We have swung open the portals on a new world.

—THE NEW REPUBLIC

the welfare of agriculture and of the Nation as a whole. A farmer wishes to make his maximum contribution to the over-all objective of adequate food and fiber for our own people and those of other countries. He also wants an income that will provide a living for his family equivalent to the kind enjoyed by persons engaged in occupations that require similar investment, skill, and labor. Farmers want to maintain many family farms with tenure and credit conditions that promote stability, security, and a chance to advance up the agricultural ladder.

Guiding Principles

The Department of Agriculture and the State Colleges and Experiment Stations are giving attention to the advisability of and the opportunities for bringing additional land into agricultural use, as well as opportunities on lands now in farms. Recently in a study on post-war problems undertaken jointly by the Department and the Land Grant Colleges, farm-settlement opportunities and what should or should not be done to aid returning soldiers and others to get established on farms were considered.

Some principles based on experience that should be followed in guiding those who want to settle on the land were developed in this work. Briefly, they are:

(1) Farm-family selection on the basis of experience, knowledge of farming, personal adaptability, apti-

tude and enthusiasm for farm life, is one of the most influential factors making for success. Accurate appraisal of a person's ability to farm is as important as accurate appraisal of the farm and its resources. *

(2) Selection of a productive farm of proper size or land that can be developed into good economic units is essential to success.

(3) Experience indicates the inadvisability of large numbers of veterans concentrating in a new community to the exclusion of other groups. Group soldier settlement maximizes the social and economic problems in the adjustment to civilian life.

(4) The price of a farm must be based on its long-time earning capacity or "normal" value. Buying at excessively high prices has frequently loaded the purchaser with an unbearable debt obligation.

(5) Adequate credit arrangements should be available for the purchase of economic family-type units. A sound payment plan provides for variable annual payments of both principal and interest while the farm is being improved, in years of crop failure or depression and in years of high farm income.

(6) Competent guidance in farm management is needed by new farmers, particularly if liberal credit has been extended by the Government. Farmers welcome friendly, practical advice and counsel on desirable farm practices and Government programs.

(7) Agricultural programs should emphasize continued development and intensification of use of the areas that are permanently suited to crop production and the gradual retirement from farming of areas where the land resources are best

adapted to forestry, grazing, and various public purposes.

Now

Certain things can be done at the local level now. Specific arrangements should be made in each agricultural county under which all prospective farmers may find information about opportunities on farms and on new land. Thus they may be helped to avoid unsuitable places and directed toward desirable locations. Too often new farmers have received their information mainly from land-selling agencies rather than from qualified, unbiased sources. For example, although it can be learned what areas have benefitted from the reductions of floods in parts of the flood plains of the Mississippi Valley, farmers still buy farms and live on unprotected land in fateful ignorance of the facts, because no plan has been devised for reaching and informing the prospective settlers.

Differences

In any program directed to place veterans or others on the land, whether relating to infiltration into present farm areas or the opening up of new lands, such principles as here outlined must be the guides. But to carry them out calls for different techniques, mechanisms, and controls on different lands—on new-land farms in the Mississippi Delta as contrasted with farms in the Corn Belt or irrigated areas of the West. It is imperative that the best possible policies and programs be developed for the different situations.

Opportunities on farms in established agricultural areas need to be carefully explored. An analysis should be made of the number and size of farms on which (1) the operator has reached retirement age, (2) the land is suitable through intensified use and improvement to provide for additional farm families, and (3) two or more families may live although they are now single-family farms. More information is needed on undeveloped lands that can be made suitable for farming through drainage, clearing, or irrigation. Before it can be intelligently and safely developed into farms, a great deal of this land needs to be mapped in place as to soil, topography, cover, drainage, water supply, and cost of development. Accurate information should be made public on the human and monetary costs involved in improving cut-over lands, swamp lands, and dry lands. Probable returns or lack of returns should be determined. Measures to discourage or prevent settlement in areas that are unsuited to farming should be developed and applied.

To Summarize

To summarize, the land will probably again be looked toward as one means of meeting the social and economic problems arising out of maladjustments following the war. To prevent serious mistakes on the part of many people who may be seeking opportunities on the land, thoughtful planning and action are necessary now.

We have treated our land shamefully, by and large.

—RUSSELL LORD

ADVICE TO SETTLERS:

DON'T

By GEORGE S. WEHRWEIN. *With his stand based on many years of study and observation, a State worker here boldly speaks his mind.*



WE ARE boasting that the farmers of America were delivering almost half again as many goods in 1942 as in 1919 with 3 million fewer people on farms than during World War I. There are fewer than in the years preceding the present conflict. In other words, the agricultural plant is meeting war demands with reduced manpower and with probably little or no increase in total land in farms. Furthermore, this is being accomplished with an astonishing number of farmers classed as "underemployed"!

The favorable position of agriculture is shown by the realized net income which rose from an average annual income of 4.7 billion dollars in 1935-39 to 12.5 billion in 1943. Farmers are now paying with 1943 war incomes for the farms they bought in 1940. Such golden opportunities naturally result in the capitalization of the earning power, and by the time the war is over, land values will have caught up with earning power—in fact they will far exceed it. Land values for the country as a whole have already risen more than one-third since 1941. That is comparable to the boom years following World War I. Much larger increases have occurred in several

States. These rises are bound to spread to the entire agricultural area, including raw land that is not in agricultural production and in private ownership.

It is at this stage of the cycle that veterans and other post-war purchasers will have to buy their farms. But the chances are that they will have to pay for them out of greatly reduced and deflated incomes after the conflict is over.

What are the possibilities that the demand for farm products and the present level of prices will be sustained? Those who believe this will happen base their opinion on great post-war demands from a hungry world and on increased demands as we and other countries aim at full nutrition for all the people. Post-war demands are difficult to estimate. Much will depend upon the condition of agriculture in Europe and Asia. If the last war is any criterion most of the countries will be rehabilitated in a remarkably short time. Abundant shipping will bring supplies from far countries now excluded from the European market because of distance. A year or so after the war we shall find tariff policies, policies of self-sufficiency, subsidies, again determining our chances to export farm products.

Even though full employment may give our citizens the purchasing power to back up demands, full nutrition could be achieved by adding little, if any, more land to the existing area in farms and no particular increase in manpower on these farms. But it will mean shifts in land use within the present agricultural area and shifts in agricultural employment. Increases in demand because of better nutrition will be offset in part by the decreasing rate of population growth and our aging population.

About Face

In fact, instead of policies for increasing the acreage in farms and adding to the agricultural manpower in the post-war era, it would appear that our policies should be to help our agriculture to readjust to a relatively decreasing demand, lower prices, and a drastic deflation of land values.

While the demand for farm products will decline after the war the supply will not be reduced. Manpower will automatically be increased with the return of farm boys to the home farms and the home community when they are demobilized. Agriculture always has a surplus population because there are more births than deaths in the open country. This natural oversupply is augmented by city people who move to the country or who decrease the land available for settlement by buying farm land for whatever purpose. Some of these are part-time farmers. Others buy for security in a period of anticipated inflation and still others buy for sentimental reasons.

No occupation gets more free advertising than agriculture, by nov-

elists, philosophers, and publicists, who talk romantically about farming as a way of life. All of this is capitalized by land boomers, both public and private. Should we have another urban depression, the rush to the farms seen in the early 1930's may be repeated. It would again add to the costs of relief, education, and public services in counties predominantly rural and frontier in nature.

Finally, there are those who believe that the nation should have a large farm population irrespective of the consequences on the size of farms, efficiency of production, and impact on the agricultural economy. But there is no danger that we shall ever have any deficiency in agricultural population!

Curious

It is a curious and interesting fact that farmers' organizations have rarely, if ever, attacked the complex problem of low prices, unsatisfactory incomes, and the low level of farm living by trying to close the door to outsiders or by setting a limit on the acreage of land in farms. Perhaps agriculture does not lend itself to such restrictions but at least farm organizations might protest against policies for increasing acreage and manpower in agriculture.

Automatic

In spite of the fact that we do not need more land in farms, we can expect a continued automatic increase in the area of land in farms, in shifts to "higher" land uses of land within the line fence, and in higher production per acre. These

things happen in spite of low prices for farm products. Land in farms will be increased by the new lands opened recently in the Mississippi Delta, by the return of military lands to farming, by irrigation in the Grand Coulee and other projects. Crop acres on existing farms are increasing steadily. The 1940 census reported 42 million acres in farms which might be used for crops after being cleared, 8 million acres of potential cropland that could be used after drainage, and 6 million acres that could come in through irrigation.

That's Efficiency

And here comes increased production through improved techniques, new varieties, fertilization, and mechanization. These processes have been stimulated by the war and will not be discontinued just because the war is over. This affects both production and manpower—productivity per worker is speeded up and increased. Output per agricultural worker has nearly tripled since 1870. This progress has been chalked up in spite of the fact that half of our farmers produce 90 percent of the products that enter commercial markets. This is an important impetus in any program of full nutrition for nonfarm people.

Other Half

Perhaps it is idle to hope to bring the other half of our farmers up to the same level of production, but to the extent they move in that direction it will be done by reducing the unemployment on farms, by better

management, use of better equipment, increase in the size of farms, and retirement of submarginal land. In other words it will be done with a shrinkage in farm acreage and decrease in manpower—and not through an increase. Yet in some sections "settlement plans" are being proposed that will restore forest land to a farm classification so that it may be sold to service men.

If these statements are even approximately correct, there is no need for post-war settlement that will add to the total farm acreage and to the manpower on farms.

Veterans

As for the veterans who are returning to farming and really need land, they should be assisted in buying the farms that will come on the market through the retirement of farmers. More elderly farmers are active now than usual. This type of settlement would not add to the manpower on farms or to the total area of land in farms. The chief difficulty would be the high price of land in well-established communities, the rather large capital it would take to buy a farm there, and finding adequate credit on suitable terms. The old temptation will still be there to go to the poorer areas where land is cheaper or to vacant lands on the frontiers.

Why?

For some reason "soldier settlement" has always been associated with settlement on raw, uncleared, or unreclaimed land. Somehow this idea appeals to writers, legislators, public officials—and especially to the

There can be little delay in this business of farming.

—CLAUDE R. WICKARD

"land-boomers." Just why soldiers should be encouraged to try their luck at land settlement in localities where for 25 years civilian experiments in farm making have failed, is hard to comprehend. Roy J. Smith, in his study of the California State land settlements at Durham and Delhi, who published his findings in *Hilgardia*, issued by the University of California, states that the paramount reason for the failure of these colonies was the nature of the land selected, although it has sometimes been charged against inadequate management, administration, credit facilities, and the incompetence of the settlers, many of whom were former soldiers. Analysis and studies had to be made after the Settlement Board had bought the land. If feasibility studies had been made first the sites might not have been bought. Even more significant is the conclusion in the report that the Settlement Board of that State had only a few worth-while tracts to select from, in 1918, although the belief was general that California had millions of acres suitable for farm development.

On Guard

Actual past experiences should put everyone on guard against an easy acceptance of the suitability of any land for agriculture. Moreover, everyone should realize that there

will be costs of clearing or reclamation and costs while waiting for income. And there will be, almost inevitably, a low level of living before such new land is in full production. Our veterans deserve something better than being "placed" on land that turns out to be a lifelong liability.

Counteracting Policy

Policy statements that start with the premise that veterans and workers in wartime industries will go to the land and that it is our duty to direct them, find land for them, and help them get started, simply put the stamp of approval on post-war settlement. This will complicate post-war adjustment problems in agriculture and bring disappointment for the settlers. In a short time we would have to have a new set of public programs to counteract the settlement programs of the post-war era. We would have price policies, reductions of so-called surplus production, and buying out settlers inadvisedly placed on land during the land boom.

It is important that public agencies point out the facts. To do so is to formulate a policy which will help to counteract the traditional tendency to "put the soldiers on the land." It is to be hoped that foresight will provide a post-war world with full employment in all sectors of our economy and that industry and commerce will offer adequate inducements to returning veterans. Public agencies should guide and assist these men to find places in all occupations—not in farming only.

Negro Farmers

As Producers

By SHERMAN BRISCOE. *Big food totals have been rung up by Negro farm families under the stimulus of war and with the help of loans; even larger volume will come with more adequate supervision and guidance.*



NEGRO FARMERS have the potentiality for making still larger contributions toward wartime food production. They operate no less than 681,790 farms, covering more than 30 million acres, according to the 1940 census. Negro farmers operate 11 percent of the farms in the United States. Although most of their farms are small, their families are often large. If properly guided in intensified farming operations this extra manpower could produce a large volume of food. Even before the war, and with limited guidance and facilities, Negro farmers produced more than a half-billion dollars worth of farm products. Their output has increased measurably under the stimulus of war. Last year almost to a man they worked out and signed farm-production plans, calling for bigger and better gardens, or more poultry and hogs, or the addition of a milk cow, or more field crops including peanuts and soybeans to help meet the shortage of vegetable oils.

Several thousand Negroes operate highly specialized farms. In Delaware and Maryland hundreds have

gone in for large-scale poultry raising. Some have as many as 30 thousand broilers a year; others collect eggs from 5 thousand and sometimes 6 thousand layers. Throughout several areas of the South there are nearly 10 thousand Negro commercial truck farmers. Many have formed cooperatives and are shipping carloads of vegetables to market and to processing plants. And increasingly Negro farmers are taking to dairying and livestock raising. Farm Security Administration has helped scores to shift over from cotton to beef cattle in the Black Belt of Alabama and in other States of the Southeast.

That more Negro farmers are not growing food crops or producing more fiber crops is traceable directly or indirectly to the lack of modern facilities, operating capital, and effective guidance. But now the U. S. Department of Agriculture is stepping up its program for providing loans and supervision to farmers for wartime production. The two major agencies concerned with making low-interest rate loans to potential war-production farmers are the Farm Security Administration and the Farm Credit Administration.

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Hard-pressed small farmers, sharecroppers, and tenants who need some assistance to grow Food for Freedom can go to their county FSA office and talk their problems over with members of the staff. Those who are eligible for a loan may file their applications then and there. Within a few days FSA supervisors visit the farms of the prospective clients and determine what type of assistance is needed. One applicant may need a pair of mules or a brood sow. Another may need fertilizer and seed for an enlarged garden. For another a milk cow and some baby chicks may be best. Or his wife may want advice on home canning so she can preserve the right kinds and quantities of food. Whatever the problems, the FSA supervisors consider them carefully and then work out a plan with the farmer and his family to help them get started on the road to increase. These small low-income farmers could not obtain a loan elsewhere.

Loans

The size of the loan the farmer receives depends directly upon his ability and the ability of his family to grow more war crops but the family rehabilitation is not lost sight of. The loans carry a 5-percent interest rate and are usually spread over 5 years. FSA also makes loans to promising tenants, croppers, and day laborers so they can buy farms of their own. Inspired by ownership, many of these families have doubled their production records. Farm-ownership loans carry a 3 percent interest and are amortized over a 40-year period. More than 63,000 Negro farmers are on the

FSA's program, being helped through loans and supervision toward making a larger war contribution. Of this number more than 5,000 are buying farms of their own under the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act.

The FCA follows a more orthodox procedure. Its war program is directed toward financing wartime food and fiber production, financing the processing and marketing of farm products, and curbing inflation. Lending units of FCA include production credit associations, the emergency crop and feed loans, and the national farm loan associations.

Nearly half of the 530 production credit associations are in the South. One of these made loans to Negro farmers totaling \$2,000,000 in a single year. Negroes hold membership in several of these associations and they have some associations of their own.

All of these units have helped the families to put their farms on a full wartime footing. Both the FCA and the FSA have Negro agriculturalists on their staffs to advise on methods and procedures; as they work with farmers on different economic levels their techniques are somewhat dissimilar.

A Need

But loans without adequate frequent supervision cannot bring the best results, especially among many small farmers who have never had experience or schooling in modern farm management. Negro farmers suffer doubly from lack of supervision, because otherwise the bi-racial pattern of the South, where 98 percent of all Negro farmers live, shuts

them off from valued channels of information. Either colored farmers are not invited to important agricultural meetings where the discussions would add greatly to their total understanding of over-all farm programs, or if invited they are forced by custom to sit quietly off in a far corner, asking no questions. This means that they usually fail to comprehend fully the policies and procedures involved.

Expanding Supervision

To offset this handicap, Dr. F. D. Patterson, president of Tuskegee, and Claude A. Barnett, director of the Associated Negro Press, who have been added to the staff of the Secretary of Agriculture as special assistants, have consistently urged the enlargement of the present Extension staff of 580 workers, and have advised the addition of Negro personnel to the staffs of all major agricultural agencies operating in the various States. Already, in keeping with their recommendations, 6 Agricultural Adjustment State offices have appointed Negro contact representatives, Soil Conservation Service has added more Negro technicians in some of its districts, Farm Credit Administration is considering the development of a Negro field staff, and through a special fund provided by the War Food Administration 272 Negro emergency war food aides have been appointed by the Extension Service in the Southern States.

Youth Succeeds

With Extension's Negro personnel temporarily increased from 580 to 852, further increases in production

Secret

The secret of success is constancy to purpose.

—DISRAELI

by colored farmers are reasonably assured. Not only will many diffident farmers plant their crops, and start their broods of poultry and pigs with greater confidence, but the 4-H Club members stand a better chance of increasing their membership and upping their production. Since the outbreak of the war their membership has increased from a little over 190,000 to nearly 220,000. These youngsters are fully enlisted in the war effort. They have collected hundreds of carloads of scrap and bought over half a million dollars' worth of war bonds and stamps. They do farm chores and are raising thousands of tons of food. Last year 20,000 Negro 4-H clubbers each produced enough food to feed one or more fighting men. Their work is reflected in the 30 million chickens, 100 million dozen eggs, 2 billion pounds of milk, and the 620,000 Victory gardens that Negro farm families produced last year.

Foresight

At the same time these farmers are producing more, many of them are learning to take better care of their land than before. Preventive and improvement work, begun under the stimulus of payments for

soil-building practices, is continuing and is being taken up by new farmers under the guidance of the Soil Conservation Service. More and more the Negro farmers are getting away from soil-exhausting one-crop farming and are maintaining fertility for future production.

Through the Rural Electrification Administration thousands of Negro farm families now have electric lights and electric appliances. These increase the efficiency of the farm plant and help to assure full production now and later.

New Viewpoint

Obviously, Negro farm families are playing an important part in our wartime food-production program. At least a part of their success stems from the fact that they now see themselves and their jobs from an almost entirely different perspective. Once they looked on farming as devoid of opportunity. They remained on the farms mainly because they didn't quite know how to get away. But now farming is a war job. The products of their hands, their plows, their hoes, and their long hours of toil are needed to win a war. The Marine in the foxhole of New Guinea, the sailor in the hold of a submarauder prowling the South Pacific in search of a Jap prey, the soldier at Cassino are all counting on our farmers, colored and white, to keep them supplied with food. And so, farming has taken on a new importance for Negroes of the South.

After the War?

And when victory is won and peace comes again, what about the prospects of the Negro farmer? Will he carry over into the post-war era these new patterns of food production and "live-at-home" that have been the mainstay of victory? Will returning veterans looking for farms to start life all over again crowd him still farther into the poor submarginal areas and into city slums?

These are haunting questions that relate to much more than farm production. But only production is considered here. Negroes have a somewhat natural affiliation with the soil, and no matter how much they are pushed to the poor lands, or how fast they drift to the cities and to other industries, for a long time to come they are going to be an important factor in American agriculture. Given supervision and technical aid approximating that made available to other farmers generally, and assuming that Government aid will be extended during the transition period, there seems reason to believe that production for peace and for "freedom from want" can be maintained among Negro farmers at somewhere near levels now reached. And through this continued food-production program, Negro farmers should be able gradually to climb from an 80-percent tenancy to substantial ownership with improved farms and better homes.

Food Fights for Freedom

How Tenancy Retards FOOD PRODUCTION

By ELCO L. GREENSHIELDS. *Tenancy as a land problem is ever before us—in peace and war. The demands of war bring new emphasis.*



WAR has brought the subject of tenancy again to the fore. New figures illuminate it. The unprecedented effort to increase our production of food and fiber is interfered with to a significant extent by some of our tenure arrangements. Farm tenancy has presented a serious obstacle to speeding up production in many areas, and to shifting production from some of the plentiful field crops to strategic war products like livestock, dairy products, and certain protein crops.

Tenure arrangements obstruct in several ways our efforts to increase production. Typically, tenant farming is characterized by short-term leases which prevent long-range planning and reduce efficiency of operations. Too much emphasis is placed on cash crops. Tenants often cannot get or make improvements, so they do not adopt diversified crop-livestock farming. These barriers are not easily overcome, but the stakes involved are apparently high enough to justify positive action.

Until now we have not had an adequate measure of the extent to which farm tenancy restricts production, except for a few spots.

Through a special study by the Bureau of the Census of the 1940 census returns, "Value of Farm Products by Color and Tenure of Farm Operator," a break-down of the value of farm production is now available by major tenure groups—full owners, part owners, managers, tenants, and croppers. Together with other facts that we have on the land and labor resources at the disposal of each of the tenure groups, these data make possible an over-all appraisal of the relative production capacity of each group. The data are for the year 1939 when the total volume of all farm production was one-sixth less than in 1943. But it is believed that only modified shifts in the relative production capacity of the tenure groups have taken place within that time.

In 1939, 39 percent of all farm operators were working under some tenancy arrangement—crop share, livestock share, cash rent, cropper, or some combination of these. Less than 1 percent were operating under manager arrangements; 10 percent owned a part of their farms and rented additional acreage; 51 percent owned all their land.

Tenants produced 32 percent of

the value of all farm products. They had 29 percent of all farm land comprising 40 percent of all land planted to crops. Owner and manager farms, representing 61 percent of all farms, included 71 percent of all farm land and 60 percent of the cropland and were responsible for 68 percent of the value of all agricultural commodities. Thus, from the land invested in tenant farms, we received proportionately less than we did from the resources represented by owner-operated and manager-operated farms. This is true even after allowances are made for the somewhat lower quality of land in tenant farms, and for the effect of the concentration of cropper tenancy in the South. In Kansas, for example, where there are no croppers, where tenants and owners operate similar types of farms, and where the total figures are not unduly influenced by the enumeration of large numbers of part-time owner-operators, the tenants produced 37 percent of all products. But they had 45 percent of the farms comprising 40 percent of all land, 43 percent of all cropland.

Potentialities

The immediate question is whether this lower production on tenant farms should continue. Is it an inevitable result of our tenure system? Or can we step up production on our tenant farms? If their level of production could be raised to the level achieved on full-owner farms (using value of land exclusive of buildings as a measure of amount of land rather than acres of cropland or of all land), the potential increase in total output from

all tenant farms would be something like 18 percent. If the level on tenant farms could be raised to the level of all other farms, it would mean a 10½ percent increase in value of their production. By the same measure, in Iowa where both tenants and owners are high producers, it would take a 20-percent increase in production on tenant farms to equal that of the owner-manager group.

Barriers

The kind of production coming from our tenant farms is definitely of concern in war times. Tenants with 40 percent of the land planted to crops in 1939 produced 45 percent of the field crops sold or traded; they produced only 26 percent of the livestock and livestock products. Even in Illinois, where tenants are outstanding livestock producers, they raised only 42 percent of the livestock with half of the land resources of the State in their farms, according to valuation. In the decade of the 1930's tenant farming contributed heavily to the problem of so-called surpluses. Now tenancy stands as a barrier to shifting production away from cotton and tobacco and toward more butter, eggs, milk, and oil-producing crops.

Exceptions

In making these broad assertions, it is not implied that all tenants are falling behind owner-operators. Significantly different production patterns are followed by tenants in the different regions. A tenant who rents his farm on a livestock-share basis in the corn-hog or the dairy region probably does as well as

Should Be

America is another name for opportunity.

—EMERSON

owner-operators. In the East North Central States, for example, tenant farms, with 37 percent of the total cropland, produced 44 percent of the field crops entering the market and 30 percent of the livestock and livestock products. There the value of land in tenant farms averages 10 percent more than that in full-owner farms. This is the only area in which tenant lands exceed in value, and this explains their high production. In this region the notable difference between production from tenant and from owner farms is in the kind of products rather than in the quantity of production.

Croppers

The over-all United States production record of strategic war crops by tenant farmers is reduced materially by the southern cropper group, which includes nearly one-fourth of all tenants. These croppers are almost exclusively single-crop farmers. Operating 12 percent of the cropland in the South, they grew 21 percent of the field crops of that region, and contributed 13 percent of the value of all of its farm products. Their livestock production was less than 3 percent of the total for the South and less than 1 percent of the total for the country.

Southern croppers usually farm under arrangements that restrict the livestock. In the plantation system, land is used efficiently, but labor is not. The operator generally sees to it that adequate fertilizer is used for he has a substantial stake in the crop: in the South 17 percent of the value of all fertilizer was used on cropper farms—49 percent more per acre of cropland harvested than on other farms.

Manpower Losses

From the standpoint of efficient utilization of manpower, the tenant farms are far from satisfactory. In 1939 about 37 percent of our farm manpower was on tenant farms; around 9 percent on cropper farms. Full-owner operators and their hired help represented 48 percent of the total manpower; part-owner farms, 13 percent; the remainder was on manager farms. Tenants with their 37 percent slice of the manpower, produced 32 percent of the value of all farm products, 26 percent of the livestock and 45 percent of the cash crops. Croppers, with 9 percent of the farm manpower, raised 9 percent of the field crops entering the market, but they produced for sale practically no dairy, meat, truck crops, and other farm products.

On the average, the value of products per person of the year-round farm labor force of all tenure groups was \$728. In addition, farm operators contributed 209 million man-days to nonfarm jobs, and their sons and daughters undoubtedly made another big contribution. Because of the interchange of work between farms, and because no records are available on off-farm work by operators' families, efficiency

of the several tenure groups cannot be measured precisely. But reasonably reliable over-all comparisons, with allowance made for off-farm work, indicate: \$786 in income per person of the year-round labor force for all groups; \$855, for the owner and manager group; \$672, for the tenant group; and \$353, on cropper units.

Croppers Again

Production per man-year for croppers is strikingly low. In considering the possibilities for a fuller utilization of manpower on cropper units, we should not look at the national average for owner farms as the goal. Rather the South alone should be viewed. In the 16 Southern States, the value of production (sold, used, or traded by farm households) per worker in the several tenure groups was: \$463, for all tenure groups; \$535, for the owner and manager group; \$474, for the full owners; \$382, for all tenants; and \$337, for the cropper group.

Restrictions

That tenants do not produce equally with owner operators is not due altogether to their relative inefficiency. They have had to shift from farm to farm, from one community to another. They cannot be expected to operate unfamiliar farms as efficiently as owners operate theirs.

But far more important are the basic differences between farming as a tenant and farming as an owner. Tenants often are obliged to farm under restrictions prescribed by their leasing agreements. They must plant a substantial part of the

land in specified cash crops. They are usually restricted in the acres put into food crops, especially forage crops, either by contract or in practice because a high cash rent is charged for any cropland that is not planted to specified cash crops. Frequently both permanent pasture and livestock are restricted. Furthermore, the usual short-duration leases prohibit adequate crop rotation and well-balanced crop-livestock enterprises.

Land Resources

Again, tenants do not have requisite land resources. In a few sections, tenants are farming the best land, but for the country as a whole, tenants have land that is valued at \$35 per acre, while full owners have land valued at \$40. In many sections, tenant farms are more depleted in fertility and are more eroded. The typical landlord-tenant arrangement does not provide for a workable means of maintaining fertility and preventing erosion. The improvements are more run-down. Driving through virtually any part of the country we see the obvious differences. Disregarding the fact that tenancy

Ingredients

Harmony and support of the weak by the strong is the secret of prosperity.

—OLD BUDDHIST SAYING

is concerned in areas where improvements on all farms are inadequate, it would take an increase of 67 percent per farm in the value of improvements on tenant farms to equal those on owner farms.

Even existing improvements are not being maintained. Here and there they have actually been razed. In 1939, only 14 percent of the funds expended for building materials were used for construction and upkeep on tenant farms. Moreover, there is not the machinery and equipment for full, efficient production. In 1940, they had less than one-third of the implements and machinery on farms.

If Released

Considering these handicaps, it cannot be said that tenants are not doing what they can to produce food for the war. These handicaps should be removed or modified for the sake of war food if for no other reason. The war problem on ten-

ant farms is primarily a problem of kind and diversity of production.

As measured by the pace set by full owners, the national loss in production from the land and in the manpower on tenant farms is very substantial. It is too large to be ignored in our national programs. The picture of our tenancy system given by these new figures impels attention. Under war stimulus, these farms undoubtedly have overcome some of their underproduction. But the deep-rooted causes of the usual situation have not been affected. The fact that they interfere with maximizing wartime farm production converts the subject, always of social concern, squarely into a war question. And after the war, increased total production may be needed for rehabilitation abroad. Certainly we shall need a higher production per man to combat the low levels of nutrition that have prevailed on so many of our tenant farms here at home.

Language

Let us hope that in the future all school children in North America may learn Spanish and all pupils in Latin American schools may learn English, for language barriers are among the greatest obstacles to that understanding upon which the good neighbor spirit must depend.

—CHARLES I. BRAND

Thomas Jefferson

AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

By EVERETT E. EDWARDS. *Perhaps nothing was more basic and more forward looking in connection with our country's development than Jefferson's attitude and action regarding the land.*



INCIDENT to the bicentennial recognitions of Thomas Jefferson's birth, much has been said and written concerning his many contributions to the Nation that he helped to create and direct on its course in world history. As a result, the measure of our country's debt to him has been appreciably lengthened, and the attempts to assay his multitudinous interests have brought the realization that they embraced practically all human knowledge as encompassed in his time. Considering the crucial role played by the public domain in American history, an epitome of his contributions in this field will perhaps enlarge the frame of reference for those concerned with land problems today and assist in completing a comprehensive view of Jefferson's achievements as a constructive statesman.

Jefferson adhered passionately to the democratic philosophy that he embodied in the Declaration of Independence. He saw the war against the Mother Country as more than a struggle for the recognition of the political independence of thirteen English colonies along the North Atlantic coast. Medievalism in all its forms had to be uprooted

and destroyed if the destiny implied in the philosophy that he propounded was to be fulfilled. To Jefferson it was unreasonable to cast out monarchy and at the same time retain its trappings. To him the concept of democracy rested on equality of opportunity. To him the purpose of law was the protection of man not in his special privileges but in his social freedoms—freedom of conscience, of speech, of assembly, and of enterprise. Yet the law of Virginia as derived from the British crown and elaborated by a class-conscious aristocracy thwarted these freedoms.

Believing as Jefferson did, it was practically inevitable that he should hasten back to his native Virginia, once the Declaration was adopted, and give battle to the vestiges of medievalism there. By holding their lands in fee tail instead of fee simple and by devising them to the eldest son, the great families of Virginia had been able to retain and transmit their properties undivided and undiminished from generation to generation. This patrician order, to use Jefferson's own term, was a constant threat to self-government by free men for free men. To establish and perpetuate free government the economic basis of this

self-perpetuating landed aristocracy had to be undermined, if not destroyed.

Accordingly on October 1776, Jefferson introduced a bill "To enable tenants in taille to convey their land in fee simple." Ably supported by George Wythe, George Mason, and James Madison the bill was passed but by a narrow margin. Jefferson and his supporters then turned to the revision of the entire legal code. The results, embodied in 126 bills, constituted the principles of the new democracy that was being evolved. One of the bills, drawn by Jefferson, abolished primogeniture and made real estate descendible to all the heirs.

Equality

By abolishing entail and primogeniture Virginia was emancipated from these vestiges of feudalism and its citizens were given a basis for equality of economic opportunity. The example encouraged the commonwealths similarly enmeshed to do likewise. It should also be emphasized that Virginia was the largest of the thirteen commonwealths and had vast stretches of unoccupied land within its immediate borders, including what is now West Virginia and Kentucky, as well as pretensions to enormous other territories west of the Alleghenies that ultimately became part of the public domain of the United States.

Basic

In addition to leadership in the achievement of democracy in land holding, Jefferson made notable contributions to the basic framework for governing and managing the

Action

*Knowledge is not knowledge
until it operates*

—MARK VAN DOREN

public domain. In the critical period following the recognition of American independence, Jefferson joined the Congress of the Confederation as a delegate from Virginia and served on all important committees until he sailed for France to take Franklin's place as the American minister there. Among his state papers his report on the public domain, adopted with changes as the Ordinance of 1784, has been ranked by American historians in historical significance next to the Declaration of Independence. Except for its being superseded by the stronger Ordinance of 1787 it would rank among all American state papers next to the Constitution itself.

Vital Principle

This report provided that the westward growth of the country was to be under the aegis of the Confederation rather than left to the individual States. It delineated the principle that the ultimate object of settlement west of the Alleghenies was new States comparable to those already in the Union. Two stages of preliminary self-government were outlined, and whenever any of the proposed States had as many free inhabitants as the least numerous of the original thirteen,

it was to be admitted "on an equal footing with the said original states." There were also five proposals, constituting a compact, outlining the relationship of these States to the Federal Union, but the most important so far as the future was concerned—namely, that after 1800 "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said States"—was defeated by only one vote. There still remained, however, the enunciation of the vital principle of federal union. The problem of empire that had shaken and ultimately broken the British Empire in the years immediately following 1763 was on its way toward solution so far as the American Republic was concerned.

Land Disposal

Jefferson was a member of the committee that drafted the initial procedures for disposal of the lands of the public domain. The draft of the committee's report submitted in 1784 is in his handwriting, but he had gone to France before the revised report was adopted as the Ordinance of 1785. As Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784 was the foundation of the American plan of colonization, so the Ordinance of 1785 embodied the fundamentals of the American land system.

Westward

It was Jefferson who grasped the significance of the vast uncharted lands to the west of the Mississippi River, then known as Louisiana, for the future of the United States. The rumor that weak and decadent Spain had retroceded New Orleans and Louisiana to France caused

widespread alarm. The mouth of the Mississippi was the only practicable trade outlet for the pioneers on the western waters, and its possession by a powerful and aggressive France under the domination of the dictator Napoleon who had already mastered Europe was a dire threat. The possibility that Napoleon might reestablish a French empire in America, extending to British Canada and Spanish Mexico and ultimately perhaps the entire Western Hemisphere, boded no good for the young Republic headed by Jefferson.

Stirred

A measure of the extent to which he was stirred is indicated by the rapidity with which he modified the principle that he had enunciated as basic to his foreign policy. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1801, he eschewed "entangling alliances," but on April 18, 1802 he declared that "we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation," the moment Napoleon takes possession of New Orleans (and this is the germinal beginning of the Monroe Doctrine!). In October 1802 the Spanish intendant closed the Mississippi to navigation. This viola-

But—

All men desire peace, but very few desire those things that make for peace.

—THOMAS À KEMPIS

tion of the right granted in 1795 further accentuated the clamor of the westerners for war and conquest, but they acquiesced in their leader's desire to try peaceful negotiation first.

Negotiation

Throughout the negotiations, Jefferson distinguished between wishes and reasonable possibilities, but in this instance wishes became actuality. He was unequivocally opposed to the reinstatement of France on any part of the North American continent. In January 1803, before James Monroe's appointment as special envoy to Paris, Jefferson requested \$2,500 from Congress to send "an intelligent officer [his private secretary, Merriwether Lewis] with a party of 10 or 12 men to explore even to the Western Ocean and to bring back all possible information on the Indian tribes, the fauna and flora of the region." In February 1803 he wrote that "we bend our whole views to the purchase and settlement of the country on the Mississippi, from its mouth to its northern regions, that we may be able to present as strong a front on our western as on our eastern border, and plant on the Mississippi itself the means of its own defense."

Later the same year, he wrote with reference to the future: "When we shall be full on this side, we may lay off a range of States on the western bank from the head to the mouth, and so, range after range, advancing compactly as we multiply."

Forward

By ignoring "metaphysical subtleties" Jefferson doubled the area of the United States, removed dire foreign menaces to its independence, secured the vital outlet to the vast inland waterway of the continent, and provided the basis for its becoming a world power. It was, as Jefferson himself said, a great achievement.

Taking the lead in abolishing entail and primogeniture in Virginia, Jefferson contributed greatly to the removal of the dead hand of medievalism from landed property in the United States, thus providing a basis for equality of economic opportunity. His federative principle for colonial government provided a workable solution for the problem of colonial empire. His acquisition of Louisiana provided space for the normal expansion and fruition of these and related tenets that he championed and helped preserve for later generations.

Master

A husbandman is the master of the earth, turning barrenness into fruitfulness, whereby all commonwealths are maintained and upheld. His labour giveth liberty to all vocations, arts, and trades to follow their several functions with peace and industrie.

—GERVASE MARKHAM

POST-WAR PLANNING

has *No-Man's-Land*

By ARTHUR P. CHEW. *Key problems, says this observer, lie often in the overlaps between agriculture and industry, and should be attacked cooperatively*



PLANNING for the post-war years must naturally be both general and specific; it must draw a pattern for the economy as a whole, and must fill in numerous details. This requirement, though obvious, is especially difficult for agriculture. The difficulty arises partly from the overlaps, the no-man's land, the aspects of the job that concern everybody, and consequently don't appear to be anybody's business in particular. It can tend to concentrate agricultural planning on secondary matters, though without a framework into which such things can fit, and perhaps without a sufficient sense of the need for such a framework.

Examples of the overlaps are national employment policy, national price policy, the role of the Government in both domestic and foreign trade, and the outlook for international currencies and credit. Such things, which seem too big for any one interest to handle or even fully to understand, are nevertheless equally the concern of both industry and agriculture. This very fact, however, makes industry and agriculture doubt their jurisdictions so to speak, and inclines them to

hold back where they should move in. What is not wholly their separate business, they often treat as if it were not their business at all. Sometimes they move in, but don't speak out, which is almost as bad.

Secondary matters may then take the foreground in post-war planning talks. It doesn't necessarily follow that the basic matters haven't been studied by the planners. Agricultural agencies have studied them deeply; but the obstacle remains as to who should pass on them. Subsidiary projects like rural public works, rural housing, rural medical care, and cognate projects, though of great importance, can advance successfully only if broader problems are in hand, so that farming generally can prosper. Yet because these broader problems are only partly agricultural, the agricultural voice on them is sometimes faint.

It doesn't speak loud, for example, with regard to the employment question; yet nothing can be of more importance to agriculture, or more involved with agricultural matters. The idea that employment is a problem exclusively for industry or for the government, with agriculture a mere watcher from the sidelines, cannot stand up.

Practically all economists declare frankly that if we don't plan for full employment, we shall not have it; they agree, too, that the employment planning must be agricultural as well as industrial. It must deal rigorously, for example, with possible back-to-the-land movements. Yet because the employment problem is superficially urban, agricultural people hesitate to discuss it. They look around for keep-off-the-grass signs.

Danger

Avoidance of the subject can be dangerous. It may cause farmers to think full employment is in the bag and may disincline them to face the problem realistically. It may encourage the delusion, moreover, that if we do have full employment, farm problems will be largely solved. Farmers had plenty of trouble after World War I, even in the industrial boom years. Agriculture has a tremendous interest also in how the Nation tackles its employment problems. Agriculture cannot fold its hands if we have a satisfactory volume of employment in the post-war years. Some ways of providing or creating jobs might not be to agriculture's liking. Agriculture should examine the question so as to influence the choice of procedures.

Everyone acknowledges, for instance, that the shift from wartime to peacetime employment will involve the Government. Most people hope the Government's role will be minor. They would like private enterprise to supply most of the necessary employment. But no one believes private enterprise will be immediately able to supply it all.

There is virtual unanimity on that—on the proposition that for a time at any rate the Government will be a job provider to some extent.

Divergence

Only as to the proportions that should subsist between governmental and private action, do the viewpoints differ; but here the difference goes deep. One group would have the Government be extremely cautious and conservative, even at the risk of some delay in the economic pick-up; whereas another group would have the Government step in boldly at the first whisper of depression. Either policy would affect agriculture greatly though differently. Agriculture will not be in a position to choose wisely between them, if it leaves all employment planning to nonfarm groups.

Agricultural planning should include very careful analysis of the different employment possibilities, so that farmers may know at least the more important implications. Whatever the Government does, or refrains from doing, for industry and labor will have a bearing on agriculture. Any leaning, for example, toward a laissez-faire industrial policy, on the ground that industry should be allowed to feel its way a while and strive again to stand alone, might affect agriculture's ability to get commodity loans and price supports. It would not be reasonable to expect one kind of policy for urban folk and a totally different one for farmers. With industry and labor left to sink or swim, Government assistance for farmers would have hard sledding. On the other

Foresight

The future is purchased by the present.

—SAMUEL JOHNSON

hand, extensive Government help to industry would suggest a counterpart for agriculture, which might take the form of price support combined with price control. The price-control feature would arise from the Government's interest, as an indirect employer, in the worker's cost of living. Mere study of these questions is not enough. There should be widespread, active discussion.

Let's Collaborate

What the community decides about employment will have a bearing on other agricultural concerns, such as agricultural price policy and agricultural foreign trade. Employment policy, farm-price policy, and farm-export trade policy will take form not separately but together, in an all-embracing single program. Obviously, for example, the employment we have and the way we get it will influence consumer buying power, and consequently Government policy with regard to agricultural prices.

Broadly, we may say that the less employment we have, the greater will be the need and at the same time the poorer the chance for effective agricultural price support. Furthermore, the volume of employment will affect the need for crop controls. Experience has shown

abundantly that price supports, except on a very low level, need the backing of limitations on production. This is a truism with regard to crops produced for export, and in times of unemployment applies to domestic-basis crops as well. Hence the employment problem is simultaneously the price problem and the foreign-trade problem. Agriculture has the right and duty to study all the branchings of it, even those that lead far from farming.

Three-Part Problem

Agriculture's planning should include all three legs of the tripod—employment, price-adjustment, and foreign policy. It shouldn't hesitate to enter no-man's land. Some aspects of our farm price plan lie there, mixed with national tariff matters. Our farm pricing method grew up under pressure toward economic nationalism whereas we are headed now toward freer and wider trade. Pre-war price controls, developed mainly as a response to foreign-trade depression, tended further to hamper exports. Loan rates lifted the prices of export staples far above world levels, so that export stocks piled up unsold. The moderate dumping to which we finally resorted was no true cure, as eventually we recognized ourselves in our advocacy of international com-

modity agreements. When victory provides the chance for freer trade, should we not be ready with a plan to seize it, a plan which can be fused with the Nation's total policy?

It won't be easy to sell cotton and wheat abroad at the current prices we have fixed for these commodities. Yet if we don't sell these and other commodities abroad, we shall have the surplus problem back again. And dumping will not be in good world repute. Working out the necessary price and trade readjustments, and the necessary international commodity agreements, should stand high among the post-war planning jobs. Unless we devise a better system, the one we had before the war may come back into play, and will close at least one door to an expanding farm economy. Agricultural economists know this well; but they haven't worked out a method for dealing with the overlaps—the phases of the problem that go beyond the farms. Manifestly, too, the task of devising a better program is not for economists only. Farmers must take part since the necessary ultimate decisions must come from them. Chiefly, it is the discussion feature of the planning job that lags, partly because it crosses lines of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction

Priority in agricultural post-war planning should lie with the going-concern requirements of the agricultural industry, rather than with fears that the economy will break down. It should be positive rather than negative, and should study agriculture's gearing with the whole economy—in employment policy, in

price policy, and in domestic and foreign trade. Agricultural analysts do not forget this fact. Agriculture can hold back from overlapping questions only at the risk of finding itself held to subsidiary matters, and simultaneously of being handicapped in that sphere too. Letting the big things slip out of agriculture's hands might mean letting smaller things also slip away.

True, the jurisdictional problem is very difficult. Certain matters that affect agriculture—such as currency and credit stabilization, and tariff policy—affect nonfarmers possibly more, and it might seem that by the rule of specialization nonfarmers should handle them. Yet these questions involve a hazard for farmers which they cannot overlook. Hence agricultural planning can succeed only if it ignores the rule of specialization, and deals with matters which many may regard as not its business.

To Integrate

Agricultural planning should go beyond agriculture for other reasons. Farm and other interests do not always coincide in the overlapping spheres. Agriculture's need of foreign trade, for example, may clash with industrial tariffs. Agriculture's determination not to be a dumping ground for unemployment may interfere with the desire of cities to lessen their relief expenses. Country and town don't see eye to eye on farm-price policy, and on the proper distribution of the national income. In such matters the agricultural interest should make itself known, and often should assert itself, so that general planning will not forget it.

Politically, the Nation has turned away from isolation. Our participation in the war means that. After the war the Nation may want to renounce economic and financial isolation. If so, the change will require definite planning. Agriculture's wartime program will lapse and will leave a vacuum unless we develop something to put in its place; and the fashioning of a substitute is too big a job to be done in agricultural isolation. It is impossible, for example, for agriculture to plan for abundance unless industry does likewise. In the face of industrial limitation, all-out farm production wouldn't have a chance. Planning for the kind of world we want involves agricultural and industrial planning jointly, through developing procedures to cross the jurisdiction lines.

Everyone knows the core of our dilemma. In peacetime, manufacturers and farmers reckon their welfare in terms of prices rather than in terms of production. They try to keep prices up by holding production down. Frequently, to be sure, they have no workable alternative. Unlimited production would not pay the costs, and producers would fail in droves. It has long been evident, nevertheless, that the restriction method runs into an impasse, because it curtails demand

along with supply. Manufacturers lose their customers on the farms, and farmers lose their customers in the cities. Restriction may work if only manufacturers try it, at least for them; but if farmers try it too, it breaks down badly. Adopted simultaneously in both branches of the economic system, it simply changes a surplus of goods into an unused surplus of manpower, machinery, and land.

Temporarily, the war resolves this dilemma. The war gives every producer, in both town and country, a sale for all he can produce and send to market. But when the fighting stops the dilemma will return, unless we have a plan to head it off. Manufacturers and farmers may feel themselves obliged once more to rank prices above production, and the vicious circle of restriction will have us in its grip again. Above everything else, post-war planning should seek an alternative. Obviously, the alternative must embrace both fields and factories, since the essence of the dilemma lies in the fact that it results from reciprocal restriction. Somehow, industry and agriculture must discover how to help rather than to hurt one another. The nature of the problem shows it must be attacked cooperatively, through an advance from both sides into no-man's-land.

Earthen

*The fabric of human life has been woven on earthen looms.
It everywhere smells of the clay.*

—J. H. BRADLEY



Books

TVA. DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH. By DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. Harper & Brothers Publishers. New York and London. 248 pages. (Bibliography.)

MUST either science or freedom be stifled to avoid social catastrophe? The finding of a satisfactory alternative to this question is *the* problem of the 20th century. We demand the new services and gadgets of science, yet hope for personal freedom and opportunity. Promotion of technology, primarily in physical terms, without regard to social consequences, leads directly to Fascism; while strict adherence to the social forms of the past, without regard to modern science, leads to Fascism also, but by the way of negation and frustration.

How can both technology and freedom expand? Peoples' faith in industry, in government, in science, and in themselves, depends upon the solution. To this problem Lilienthal has addressed his book—a progress report on a new experiment in democracy.

The experiment had this object: For the people of a region to use their renewable resources—like soil, water, and forests—to the limit of modern technology, on a sustained basis without waste, in the framework of a public interest that each individual helps define, within which he finds the maximum of freedom, opportunity, and responsibility, and from which he derives confidence in himself and in his fellow citizens.

The experiment was conducted in a region having great natural and human resources, only partly developed. Like all regions, it had its own combination of soil, water, forest, agricultural, and mineral resources; and its people had developed a unique pattern of skills, hopes, and ideas.

The material success of this experiment has been phenomenal, whether measured in terms of electric power, industry, flood control, agriculture, income per person, conservation, or any of the familiar criteria. Lilienthal gives the figures but he does not emphasize them. Rather he concentrates on the larger purpose of TVA, not as another agency of government to apply technology as an end in itself, but as a management system whereby the people can use all the facilities of government—National, State, and local—and their own talents, to achieve the good life for themselves as they want it and define it.

TVA has duplicated no other organization. Rather it has strengthened those already doing parts of the total job. The creation of local and State agencies, both public and private, has been urged wherever such organizations could take the responsibility or do the job as well as or better than TVA itself. This goes all the way along the line: local

school boards and traveling libraries, State universities and conservation departments, and federal bureaus for research and public health—these and many more have greater strength and responsibility because of TVA. Moreover, as the policies in the valley are developed by people and for people, private industry, farm cooperatives, labor unions, and business associations are as important to the process as are agencies of government.

Lilienthal makes a convincing case for grass roots administration as opposed to centralization of management decisions in either New York or Washington. He shows clearly that authority and administration are separate ideas. TVA draws its power from centralized authority but the administration is decentralized to a degree unrealized before in large public or private undertakings. On the material side, the results are there for anyone to see: and the speed, effectiveness, and smoothness with which the Valley girded itself for war showed an unexcelled flexibility.

But of greater significance is the social or human side. In this system, the scientist or expert—in TVA or in any of the hundreds of co-operating groups—can do his work free from political or bureaucratic chains, on the one hand, and without dangerous grants of autocratic power on the other. So can the farmer, the business man, the politician, the school teacher, and the industrial worker.

Patently yet firmly, Lilienthal warns his readers against false decentralization—against so-called decentralization through regional offices where the real decisions are made at the headquarters in Wash-

ington, Baltimore, New York, or other distant point—which is no decentralization at all. Such regional set-ups lack all the essentials that make TVA successful. These he lists:

- “—a Federal autonomous agency, with authority to make its decisions in the region
- responsibility to deal with resources, as a unified whole, clearly fixed in the regional agency, not divided among several centralized federal agencies
- a policy, fixed by law, that the Federal regional agency work co-operatively with and through local and State agencies.”

Should there be more regional agencies, really decentralized according to these principles, in the author's view the problem of coordination through policy formation by the Congress and the Executive would be much less than the job of coordinating centralized agencies, working throughout the country along narrow functional lines, but with the divided authority that leads to both competition and buck-passing. More important, is the essential need for recognizing the local differences in resources, in people, and in the necessities of both. He summarizes: “*Decentralization frankly seeks to promote diversity; centralization requires uniformity and standardization.*” [Author's italics.]

The compactness of the book defies abstracting—it is itself an abstract of the work, ideas, and results of thousands of people doing and thinking thousands of things together. It has the style of a sin-

cere and busy man with much to tell that must be told accurately and simply, without passion or oversimplification. The result is a practical social document of far-reaching importance for all those everywhere who want to work—for "The dreamers with shovels (who) want only a job that is magnificent enough, room enough to stand in, and a chance to make a start. They see a start as only that. For this is a continuing process, this improving the physical environment of

men. It is never finished. There is no end, no blueprint of a finished product."

With all the facts and figures, and patient explanations, this is a simple book, easy to understand. It requires only that the reader be able to work in the real world, where the slate is never quite clean, and have a touch of that higher virtue beyond tolerance—appreciation, appreciation for the ideas and help of the other fellow.

—Charles E. Kellogg

MAN'S FOOD, ITS RHYME OR REASON. By MARK GRAUBARD. The Macmillan Company. New York. 213 pages.

BOOKS on food have so often been written by heavy-handed scientists or by light-minded faddists and recipe makers that the lay reader generally is inclined to shy away from new volumes on the subject. Even the dramatic story of the vitamins and their effect on ancient scourges like rickets, pellagra, and scurvy has too often been dull on the printed page. Dr. Graubard's book, therefore, is a pleasant surprise not only because much of it is such easy reading but also because it is an account of man's behavior and progress through the ages as expressed in his food. The book is unusual also because its author is a biochemist whose interest in nutrition came about through a study of the social, psychological and physical relationships in primitive man, and who has found in food a means of teaching tolerance and international understanding. Dr. Graubard's wide travel combined with his historical studies have given him a broader point of view toward food and its

significance in war and peace than is found in most books on the subject. The chapters on meat, sugar, and spices are among the most readable.

The book gives the impression of hasty writing. It suffers from considerable repetition and frequently skims the surface of important subjects that would seem worthy of more discussion. No reference is given to the source of many quotations. The scientists, teachers, and extension workers who have been spreading the gospel of good nutrition for many years can hardly be cheered by the statement that the National Nutrition Conference called by President Roosevelt in May 1941 "constituted the first effort at awakening the American people to the realization that adequate food and sound eating habits should be the concern of the people themselves as well as of their government." The broad thesis of this book calls for more depth of treatment.

—Helen Crouch Douglass

GIVE US THIS DAY. By CLARE LEIGHTON. Reynal & Hitchcock. New York. 86 pages.

FOR MORE THAN a decade Clare Leighton has been known to America for her woodcuts. Living in the United States for about 8 years, this English author-artist now records in moving prose and graphic form her impressions of rural America. But her love of the earth and farm people has no geographical boundaries, for both text and illustrations have significance to people of all nations.

Give Us This Day is a saga of the earth. It sings of the eternal power of growth and productivity of the soil. From fields, prairies, valleys, orchards, and gardens man derives nourishment to create, to build a civilization, to shape the destiny of the world in which he lives.

Seen with the keen eyes of an artist and creatively expressed in poetic prose, the story traces production and distribution of basic food products from primitive processes, still practiced by poor farmers in certain areas today, to the mechanized methods of 20th century large-scale farming.

Across the vast American continent through a network of transportation are brought the products of the farm, uniting urban and rural dweller in a common bond. Each creates and is dependent upon the other. But without food man cannot exist. Hence the farmer plays the leading role in this great drama.

A series of imaginative scenes portray the farmer accepting servitude to the earth and his animals, courageously facing the inevitable strug-

gle against natural elements, serene in the knowledge that he and his wife are the guardians of life since without their labor man must perish. His peace and happiness are not based on material things but spring from the fact that he is a creator, working with forces beyond the comprehension of mankind, and living in accordance with the rhythm of the seasons "he is secure in his own worth."

The book strikes a note of hope in a war-weary world, for across the surface of the earth the topsoil lies ready to receive the seed that man shall sow when war ceases. Frontiers have been swept away and America can no longer afford to neglect the precious life-giving elements of the soil. Responsibility for the survival of mankind rests on the broad shoulders of the farmer. The author gives us faith that he is equal to the task.

THE ILLUSTRATIONS (chalk drawings—reproduced by the gravure process) are a departure from Clare Leighton's superlative woodcuts. The textural qualities inherent in the medium itself impart a luminous sparkle, depth, and delicate tonal effect to the artist's work. Masses are lighter and greater areas of white are disclosed than in the woodcuts, but the direct simplicity of design and tender interpretation of rural scene and life are the same. Skillfully rendered with freedom and power, the drawings are especially well adapted to the text.

—Mary La Follette

ACTION FOR CITIES: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING. Published under the sponsorship of the American Municipal Association, American Society of Planning Officials, and International City Managers' Association. Public Administration Service. No. 86. Chicago. 77 pages.

THIS GUIDEBOOK, the joint effort of three organizations, represents an orderly and lucid marshaling of steps necessary to effective community planning, explaining the planning procedure, discussing the planning method, suggesting in general what the plans should cover, and indicating the agencies now prepared to give technical aid and information to local planners.

Present-day concepts of city planning include more than considerations of physical lay-out. They encompass also the total economic and social life of the community, touching upon health, education, recreation, housing, air transport, and industrial and general commercial development.

The primary reason for this handbook is that, despite the shortage of technicians capable of directing planning programs, prompt action in city planning is imperative, and local planning bodies must carry on the work. In the absence of trained planning personnel, a compendium of this kind should prove an invaluable guide.

Of particular interest here is the attention devoted to problems of land use.

Instead of surrendering to the acceptance of existing conditions, the problem of land use should be approached from the viewpoint of what is needed.

It is necessary to study trends of changing land use and to interpret them by discovering which areas are

free to change and which must be tentatively considered fixed because they are now being put to the use to which they are best adapted or because of natural limitations.

Once plans are made it is urged that something be done about them. "Plans that are left on the shelf to gather dust are of no benefit to the city and its people. Plans must be brought to action, and the program of action should be as comprehensive as the plans." Planning must be a continuous process, and plans should be laid for stated intervals, such as 6-year periods and 20-year periods. Now, too, plans should be laid for the war period and for the demobilization. Decisions must be reached as to the responsibilities to be undertaken by public and private community groups and agencies.

Other important considerations include tools for action—legislation, administrative arrangements, tax and revenue devices, public controls of development, and incentives to private action—and ways of financing a planning program.

Means of stimulating a continuing interest and activity are suggested. Plans for community development have been long in the making and relatively scarce in application, but the current accent on planning generally stimulates the hope that in the post-war years many plans made at the community level will be brought to reality.

—Catherine C. Carmody

MEET THE FARMERS. By LADD HAYSTEAD. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York. 221 pages.

NO DOUBT there are many people on Manhattan Island who are ripe for some re-education in rustica. Mr. Haystead has written a book for them.

Like a certain other veteran columnist, he seems to have been everywhere and seen everything. And his travels seem to have made him quite an iconoclast. He breaks idols with great abandon. Thus, there is no farm leader who can speak for "the farmers"; only a group of more or less regional Emcees, as the author labels his chapter devoted to Messrs. O'Neal, Goss, Patton, Babcock, et al. There isn't any typical farmer, nor any single farm problem—rather some 6 million of each. The best organs of information concerning the farm regions are the *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Chicago Journal of Commerce*—perhaps modesty impelled him to omit *Fortune Magazine*. The self-appointed farm experts are sawdust effigies. The family-size farm is waning, realism being on the side of bigness and management (although much subsistence farming may well be retained).

Some of the Ozarkian chapter headings—"Come In An' Set"—"Look The Place Over"—stand up rather strangely amid the city-room sophistication of the text. But there is a chapter called "Nine Million Poor Relations" which makes the case for placing a lot of deserving people on small farms instead of on relief, and regardless of the heading it makes sense. In another headed

"The Tool Shed" are lumped a miscellany of observations of farm politics, soil conservation, how to sell to the farm market, and the unsung contributions of city men to farm progress. The chapter which, like a sort of bucolic Duncan Hines, leads us on a national tour of farm dining rooms, unquestionably stirs both memory and appetite; also it tactfully reminds all urban cousins that the farmer still eats at the first table.

Despite its faintly cynical aroma, this book has enough flashes of understanding and shrewd insight to make you take it seriously. There isn't any sham about it. If the author flits three times over the continent in three paragraphs, nevertheless every mesa and barnyard is authentic. Sizing up certain modern changes in ways of doing things and in farmer viewpoint, it reaches interpretive breadth beyond the ordinary.

ALL IN ALL, Mr. Haystead has brought back to Manhattan a thoroughly individualistic report from the farm front. He doesn't hesitate to challenge some of the dogmas long accepted on the Potomac and on Sutter's Creek as well. One would think it more than likely that so clever a pen, having some day finished its mission of telling the Rotary Club what not to believe about the farmers, might write one of those rare books that really make you feel the good earth of America under your hand.

—A. B. Genung

Universal

There is a maxim universally agreed upon in agriculture, that nothing must be done too late; and again, that everything must be done at its proper season; while there is a third precept which reminds us that opportunities lost can never be regained.

—PLINY THE ELDER

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which
ELDER